How to Comply with Competition Laws
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How to Comply with Competition Laws
By Sam Vaknin
Author of "Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited"
A. THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMPETITION
The aims of competition (anti-trust) laws are to ensure that
consumers pay the lowest possible price (the most efficient price)
coupled with the highest quality of the goods and services which
they consume. This, according to current economic theories, can be
achieved only through effective competition. Competition not only
reduces particular prices of specific goods and services - it also
tends to have a deflationary effect by reducing the general price
level. It pits consumers against producers, producers against other
producers (in the battle to win the heart of consumers) and even
consumers against consumers (for example in the healthcare sector in
the USA). This everlasting conflict does the miracle of increasing
quality with lower prices. Think about the vast improvement on both
scores in electrical appliances. The VCR and PC of yesteryear cost
thrice as much and provided one third the functions at one tenth the
speed.
Competition has innumerable advantages:
1.. It encourages manufacturers and service providers to be more
efficient, to better respond to the needs of their customers, to
innovate, to initiate, to venture. In professional words: it
optimizes the allocation of resources at the firm level and, as a
result, throughout the national economy.
More simply: producers do not waste resources (capital), consumers
and businesses pay less for the same goods and services and, as a
result, consumption grows to the benefit of all involved.
2.. The other beneficial effect seems, at first sight, to be an
adverse one: competition weeds out the failures, the incompetents,
the inefficient, the fat and slow to respond. Competitors pressure
one another to be more efficient, leaner and meaner. This is the
very essence of capitalism. It is wrong to say that only the
consumer benefits. If a firm improves itself, re-engineers its
production processes, introduces new management techniques,
modernizes - in order to fight the competition, it stands to reason
that it will reap the rewards. Competition benefits the economy, as
a whole, the consumers and other producers by a process of natural
economic selection where only the fittest survive. Those who are not
fit to survive die out and cease to waste the rare resources of
humanity.
Thus, paradoxically, the poorer the country, the less resources it
has - the more it is in need of competition. Only competition can
secure the proper and most efficient use of its scarce resources, a
maximization of its output and the maximal welfare of its citizens
(consumers). Moreover, we tend to forget that the biggest consumers
are businesses (firms). If the local phone company is inefficient
(because no one competes with it, being a monopoly) - firms will
suffer the most: higher charges, bad connections, lost time, effort,
money and business. If the banks are dysfunctional (because there is
no foreign competition), they will not properly service their
clients and firms will collapse because of lack of liquidity. It is
the business sector in poor countries which should head the crusade
to open the country to competition.
Unfortunately, the first discernible results of the introduction of
free marketry are unemployment and business closures. People and
firms lack the vision, the knowledge and the wherewithal needed to
support competition. They fiercely oppose it and governments
throughout the world bow to protectionist measures. To no avail.
Closing a country to competition will only exacerbate the very
conditions which necessitate its opening up. At the end of such a
wrong path awaits economic disaster and the forced entry of
competitors. A country which closes itself to the world - will be
forced to sell itself cheaply as its economy will become more and
more inefficient, less and less competitive.
The Competition Laws aim to establish fairness of commercial conduct
among entrepreneurs and competitors which are the sources of said
competition and innovation.
Experience - later buttressed by research - helped to establish the
following four principles:
1.. There should be no barriers to the entry of new market players
(barring criminal and moral barriers to certain types of activities
and to certain goods and services offered).
2.. A larger scale of operation does introduce economies of scale
(and thus lowers prices).
This, however, is not infinitely true. There is a Minimum
Efficient Scale - MES - beyond which prices will begin to rise due
to monopolization of the markets. This MES was empirically fixed at
10% of the market in any one good or service. In other words:
companies should be encouraged to capture up to 10% of their market
(=3Dto lower prices) and discouraged to cross this barrier, lest
prices tend to rise again.
3.. Efficient competition does not exist when a market is
controlled by less than 10 firms with big size differences. An
oligopoly should be declared whenever 4 firms control more than 40%
of the market and the biggest of them controls more than 12% of it.
4.. A competitive price will be comprised of a minimal cost plus
an equilibrium profit which does not encourage either an exit of
firms (because it is too low), nor their entry (because it is too
high).
Left to their own devices, firms tend to liquidate competitors
(predation), buy them out or collude with them to raise prices. The
1890 Sherman Antitrust Act in the USA forbade the latter (section 1)
and prohibited monopolization or dumping as a method to eliminate
competitors. Later acts (Clayton, 1914 and the Federal Trade
Commission Act of the same year) added forbidden activities: tying
arrangements, boycotts, territorial divisions, non-competitive
mergers, price discrimination, exclusive dealing, unfair acts,
practices and methods. Both consumers and producers who felt
offended were given access to the Justice Department and to the FTC
or the right to sue in a federal court and be eligible to receive
treble damages.
It is only fair to mention the "intellectual competition", which
opposes the above premises. Many important economists thought (and
still do) that competition laws represent an unwarranted and harmful
intervention of the State in the markets. Some believed that the
State should own important industries (J.K. Galbraith), others -
that industries should be encouraged to grow because only size
guarantees survival, lower prices and innovation (Ellis Hawley). Yet
others supported the cause of laissez faire (Marc Eisner).
These three antithetical approaches are, by no means, new. One led
to socialism and communism, the other to corporatism and monopolies
and the third to jungle-ization of the market (what the Europeans
derisively call: the Anglo-Saxon model).
B. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
Why does the State involve itself in the machinations of the free
market? Because often markets fail or are unable or unwilling to
provide goods, services, or competition. The purpose of competition
laws is to secure a competitive marketplace and thus protect the
consumer from unfair, anti-competitive practices. The latter tend to
increase prices and reduce the availability and quality of goods and
services offered to the consumer.
Such state intervention is usually done by establishing a
governmental Authority with full powers to regulate the markets and
ensure their fairness and accessibility to new entrants. Lately,
international collaboration between such authorities yielded a
measure of harmonization and coordinated action (especially in cases
of trusts which are the results of mergers and acquisitions).
Yet, competition law embodies an inherent conflict: while protecting
local consumers from monopolies, cartels and oligopolies - it
ignores the very same practices when directed at foreign consumers.
Cartels related to the country's foreign trade are allowed even
under GATT/WTO rules (in cases of dumping or excessive export
subsidies). Put simply: governments regard acts which are criminal
as legal if they are directed at foreign consumers or are part of
the process of foreign trade.
A country such as Macedonia - poor and in need of establishing its
export sector - should include in its competition law at least two
protective measures against these discriminatory practices:
1.. Blocking Statutes - which prohibit its legal entities from
collaborating with legal procedures in other countries to the extent
that this collaboration adversely affects the local export industry.
2.. Clawback Provisions - which will enable the local courts to
order the refund of any penalty payment decreed or imposed by a
foreign court on a local legal entity and which exceeds actual
damage inflicted by unfair trade practices of said local legal
entity. US courts, for instance, are allowed to impose treble
damages on infringing foreign entities. The clawback provisions are
used to battle this judicial aggression.
Competition policy is the antithesis of industrial policy. The
former wishes to ensure the conditions and the rules of the game -
the latter to recruit the players, train them and win the game. The
origin of the former is in the 19th century USA and from there it
spread to (really was imposed on) Germany and Japan, the defeated
countries in the 2nd World War. The European Community (EC)
incorporated a competition policy in articles 85 and 86 of the Rome
Convention and in Regulation 17 of the Council of Ministers, 1962.
Still, the two most important economic blocks of our time have
different goals in mind when implementing competition policies. The
USA is more interested in economic (and econometric) results while
the EU emphasizes social, regional development and political
consequences. The EU also protects the rights of small businesses
more vigorously and, to some extent, sacrifices intellectual
property rights on the altar of fairness and the free movement of
goods and services.
Put differently: the USA protects the producers and the EU shields
the consumer. The USA is interested in the maximization of output at
whatever social cost - the EU is interested in the creation of a
just society, a liveable community, even if the economic results
will be less than optimal.
There is little doubt that Macedonia should follow the EU example.
Geographically, it is a part of Europe and, one day, will be
integrated in the EU. It is socially sensitive, export oriented, its
economy is negligible and its consumers are poor, it is besieged by
monopolies and oligopolies.
In my view, its competition laws should already incorporate the
important elements of the EU (Community) legislation and even
explicitly state so in the preamble to the law. Other, mightier,
countries have done so. Italy, for instance, modelled its Law number
287 dated 10/10/90 "Competition and Fair Trading Act" after the EC
legislation. The law explicitly says so.
The first serious attempt at international harmonization of national
antitrust laws was the Havana Charter of 1947. It called for the
creation of an umbrella operating organization (the International
Trade Organization or "ITO") and incorporated an extensive body of
universal antitrust rules in nine of its articles. Members were
required to "prevent business practices affecting international
trade which restrained competition, limited access to markets, or
fostered monopolistic control whenever such practices had harmful
effects on the expansion of production or trade". the latter
included:
1.. Fixing prices, terms, or conditions to be observed in dealing
with others in the purchase, sale, or lease of any product;
2.. Excluding enterprises from, or allocating or dividing, any
territorial market or field of business activity, or allocating
customers, or fixing sales quotas or purchase quotas;
3.. Discriminating against particular enterprises;
4.. Limiting production or fixing production quotas;
5.. Preventing by agreement the development or application of
technology or invention, whether patented or non-patented; and
6.. Extending the use of rights under intellectual property
protections to matters which, according to a member's laws and
regulations, are not within the scope of such grants, or to products
or conditions of production, use, or sale which are not likewise the
subject of such grants.
GATT 1947 was a mere bridging agreement but the Havana Charter
languished and died due to the objections of a protectionist US
Senate.
There are no antitrust/competition rules either in GATT 1947 or in
GATT/WTO 1994, but their provisions on antidumping and
countervailing duty actions and government subsidies constitute some
elements of a more general antitrust/competition law.
GATT, though, has an International Antitrust Code Writing Group
which produced a "Draft International Antitrust Code" (10/7/93). It
is reprinted in =A7II, 64 Antitrust & Trade Regulation Reporter (BNA),
Special Supplement at S-3 (19/8/93).
Four principles guided the (mostly German) authors:
1.. National laws should be applied to solve international
competition problems;
2.. Parties, regardless of origin, should be treated as locals;
3.. A minimum standard for national antitrust rules should be set
(stricter measures would be welcome); and
4.. The establishment of an international authority to settle
disputes between parties over antitrust issues.
The 29 (well-off) members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) formed rules governing the
harmonization and coordination of international
antitrust/competition regulation among its member nations ("The
Revised Recommendation of the OECD Council Concerning Cooperation
between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting
International Trade," OECD Doc. No. C(86)44 (Final) (June 5, 1986),
also in 25 International Legal Materials 1629 (1986). A revised
version was reissued. According to it, " .Enterprises should refrain
from abuses of a dominant market position; permit purchasers,
distributors, and suppliers to freely conduct their businesses;
refrain from cartels or restrictive agreements; and consult and
cooperate with competent authorities of interested countries".
An agency in one of the member countries tackling an antitrust case,
usually notifies another member country whenever an antitrust
enforcement action may affect important interests of that country or
its nationals (see: OECD Recommendations on Predatory Pricing, 1989).
The United States has bilateral antitrust agreements with Australia,
Canada, and Germany, which was followed by a bilateral agreement
with the EU in 1991. These provide for coordinated antitrust
investigations and prosecutions. The United States thus reduced the
legal and political obstacles which faced its extraterritorial
prosecutions and enforcement. The agreements require one party to
notify the other of imminent antitrust actions, to share relevant
information, and to consult on potential policy changes. The EU-U.S.
Agreement contains a "comity" principle under which each side
promises to take into consideration the other's interests when
considering antitrust prosecutions. A similar principle is at the
basis of Chapter 15 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) - cooperation on antitrust matters.
The United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices
adopted a code of conduct in 1979/1980 that was later integrated as
a U.N. General Assembly Resolution [U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/10
(1980)]: "The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and
Rules".
According to its provisions, "independent enterprises should refrain
from certain practices when they would limit access to markets or
otherwise unduly restrain competition".
The following business practices are prohibited:
1.. Agreements to fix prices (including export and import prices);
2.. Collusive tendering;
3.. Market or customer allocation (division) arrangements;
4.. Allocation of sales or production by quota;
5.. Collective action to enforce arrangements, e.g., by concerted
refusals to deal;
6.. Concerted refusal to sell to potential importers; and
7.. Collective denial of access to an arrangement, or association,
where such access is crucial to competition and such denial might
hamper it. In addition, businesses are forbidden to engage in the
abuse of a dominant position in the market by limiting access to it
or by otherwise restraining competition by:
1.. Predatory behaviour towards competitors;
2.. Discriminatory pricing or terms or conditions in the supply
or purchase of goods or services;
3.. Mergers, takeovers, joint ventures, or other acquisitions of
control;
4.. Fixing prices for exported goods or resold imported goods;
5.. Import restrictions on legitimately-marked trademarked
goods;
6.. Unjustifiably - whether partially or completely - refusing
to deal on an enterprise's customary commercial terms, making the
supply of goods or services dependent on restrictions on the
distribution or manufacturer of other goods, imposing restrictions
on the resale or exportation of the same or other goods, and
purchase "tie-ins".
C. ANTI - COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES
Any Competition Law in Macedonia should, in my view, excplicitly
include strict prohibitions of the following practices (further
details can be found in Porter's book - "Competitive Strategy").
These practices characterize the Macedonian market. They influence
the Macedonian economy by discouraging foreign investors,
encouraging inefficiencies and mismanagement, sustaining
artificially high prices, misallocating very scarce resources,
increasing unemployment, fostering corrupt and criminal practices
and, in general, preventing the growth that Macedonia could have
attained.
Strategies for Monopolization
Exclude competitors from distribution channels. - This is common
practice in many countries. Open threats are made by the
manufacturers of popular products: "If you distribute my
competitor's products - you cannot distribute mine. So, choose."
Naturally, retail outlets, dealers and distributors will always
prefer the popular product to the new. This practice not only blocks
competition - but also innovation, trade and choice or variety.
Buy up competitors and potential competitors. - There is nothing
wrong with that. Under certain circumstances, this is even
desirable. Think about the Banking System: it is always better to
have fewer banks with bigger capital than many small banks with
capital inadequacy (remember the TAT affair). So, consolidation is
sometimes welcome, especially where scale represents viability and a
higher degree of consumer protection. The line is thin and is
composed of both quantitative and qualitative criteria. One way to
measure the desirability of such mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is
the level of market concentration following the M&A. Is a new
monopoly created? Will the new entity be able to set prices
unperturbed? stamp out its other competitors? If so, it is not
desirable and should be prevented.
Every merger in the USA must be approved by the antitrust
authorities. When multinationals merge, they must get the approval
of all the competition authorities in all the territories in which
they operate. The purchase of "Intuit" by "Microsoft" was prevented
by the antitrust department (the "Trust-busters"). A host of
airlines was conducting a drawn out battle with competition
authorities in the EU, UK and the USA lately.
Use predatory [below-cost] pricing (also known as dumping) to
eliminate competitors. - This tactic is mostly used by manufacturers
in developing or emerging economies and in Japan. It consists
of "pricing the competition out of the markets". The predator sells
his products at a price which is lower even than the costs of
production. The result is that he swamps the market, driving out all
other competitors. Once he is left alone - he raises his prices back
to normal and, often, above normal. The dumper loses money in the
dumping operation and compensates for these losses by charging
inflated prices after having the competition eliminated.
Raise scale-economy barriers. - Take unfair advantage of size and
the resulting scale economies to force conditions upon the
competition or upon the distribution channels. In many countries Big
Industry lobbies for a legislation which will fit its purposes and
exclude its (smaller) competitors.
Increase "market power (share) and hence profit potential".
Study the industry's "potential" structure and ways it can be made
less competitive. - Even thinking about sin or planning it should be
prohibited. Many industries have "think tanks" and experts whose
sole function is to show the firm the way to minimize competition
and to increase its market shares. Admittedly, the line is very
thin: when does a Marketing Plan become criminal?
Arrange for a "rise in entry barriers to block later entrants"
and "inflict losses on the entrant". - This could be done by
imposing bureaucratic obstacles (of licencing, permits and
taxation), scale hindrances (no possibility to distribute small
quantities), "old boy networks" which share political clout and
research and development, using intellectual property right to block
new entrants and other methods too numerous to recount. An effective
law should block any action which prevents new entry to a market.
Buy up firms in other industries "as a base from which to change
industry structures" there. - This is a way of securing exclusive
sources of supply of raw materials, services and complementing
products. If a company owns its suppliers and they are single or
almost single sources of supply - in effect it has monopolized the
market. If a software company owns another software company with a
product which can be incorporated in its own products - and the two
have substantial market shares in their markets - then their
dominant positions will reinforce each other's.
"Find ways to encourage particular competitors out of the
industry". - If you can't intimidate your competitors you might wish
to "make them an offer that they cannot refuse". One way is to buy
them, to bribe the key personnel, to offer tempting opportunities in
other markets, to swap markets (I will give you my market share in a
market which I do not really care about and you will give me your
market share in a market in which we are competitors). Other ways
are to give the competitors assets, distribution channels and so on
providing that they collude in a cartel.
"Send signals to encourage competition to exit" the industry. - Such
signals could be threats, promises, policy measures, attacks on the
integrity and quality of the competitor, announcement that the
company has set a certain market share as its goal (and will,
therefore, not tolerate anyone trying to prevent it from attaining
this market share) and any action which directly or indirectly
intimidates or convinces competitors to leave the industry. Such an
action need not be positive - it can be negative, need not be done
by the company - can be done by its political proxies, need not be
planned - could be accidental. The results are what matters.
Macedonia's Competition Law should outlaw the following, as well:
'Intimidate' Competitors
Raise "mobility" barriers to keep competitors in the least-
profitable segments of the industry. - This is a tactic which
preserves the appearance of competition while subverting it. Certain
segments, usually less profitable or too small to be of interest, or
with dim growth prospects, or which are likely to be opened to
fierce domestic and foreign competition are left to the competition.
The more lucrative parts of the markets are zealously guarded by the
company. Through legislation, policy measures, withholding of
technology and know-how - the firm prevents its competitors from
crossing the river into its protected turf.
Let little firms "develop" an industry and then come in and take it
over. - This is precisely what Netscape is saying that Microsoft is
doing to it. Netscape developed the now lucrative Browser
Application market. Microsoft was wrong in discarding the Internet
as a fad. When it was found to be wrong - Microsoft reversed its
position and came up with its own (then, technologically inferior)
browser (the Internet Explorer). It offered it free (sound
suspiciously like dumping) to buyers of its operating
system, "Windows". Inevitably it captured more than 30% of the
market, crowding out Netscape. It is the view of the antitrust
authorities in the USA that Microsoft utilized its dominant position
in one market (that of the Operating Systems) to annihilate a
competitor in another (that of the browsers).
Engage in "promotional warfare" by "attacking shares of others". -
This is when the gist of a marketing, lobbying, or advertising
campaign is to capture the market share of the competition. Direct
attack is then made on the competition just in order to abolish it.
To sell more in order to maximize profits, is allowed and
meritorious - to sell more in order to eliminate the competition is
wrong and should be disallowed.
Use price retaliation to "discipline" competitors. - Through dumping
or even unreasonable and excessive discounting. This could be
achieved not only through the price itself. An exceedingly long
credit term offered to a distributor or to a buyer is a way of
reducing the price. The same applies to sales, promotions, vouchers,
gifts. They are all ways to reduce the effective price. The customer
calculates the money value of these benefits and deducts them from
the price.
Establish a "pattern" of severe retaliation against challengers
to "communicate commitment" to resist efforts to win market share. -
Again, this retaliation can take a myriad of forms: malicious
advertising, a media campaign, adverse legislation, blocking
distribution channels, staging a hostile bid in the stock exchange
just in order to disrupt the proper and orderly management of the
competitor. Anything which derails the competitor whenever he makes
a headway, gains a larger market share, launches a new product - can
be construed as a "pattern of retaliation".
Maintain excess capacity to be used for "fighting" purposes to
discipline ambitious rivals. - Such excess capacity could belong to
the offending firm or - through cartel or other arrangements - to a
group of offending firms.
Publicize one's "commitment to resist entry" into the market.
Publicize the fact that one has a "monitoring system" to detect any
aggressive acts of competitors.
Announce in advance "market share targets" to intimidate competitors
into yielding their market share.
Proliferate Brand Names
Contract with customers to "meet or match all price cuts (offered by
the competition)" thus denying rivals any hope of growth through
price competition.
Secure a big enough market share to "corner" the "learning curve,"
thus denying rivals an opportunity to become efficient. - Efficiency
is gained by an increase in market share. Such an increase leads to
new demands imposed by the market, to modernization, innovation, the
introduction of new management techniques (example: Just In Time
inventory management), joint ventures, training of personnel,
technology transfers, development of proprietary intellectual
property and so on. Deprived of a growing market share - the
competitor will not feel pressurized to learn and to better itself.
In due time, it will dwindle and die.
Acquire a wall of "defensive" patents to deny competitors access to
the latest technology.
"Harvest" market position in a no-growth industry by raising prices,
lowering quality, and stopping all investment and advertising in it.
Create or encourage capital scarcity. - By colluding with sources of
financing (e.g., regional, national, or investment banks), by
absorbing any capital offered by the State, by the capital markets,
through the banks, by spreading malicious news which serve to lower
the credit-worthiness of the competition, by legislating special tax
and financing loopholes and so on.
Introduce high advertising-intensity. - This is very difficult to
measure. There could be no objective criteria which will not go
against the grain of the fundamental right to freedom of expression.
However, truth in advertising should be strictly imposed. Practices
such as dragging a competitor through the mud or derogatorily
referring to its products or services in advertising campaigns
should be banned and the ban should be enforced.
Proliferate "brand names" to make it too expensive for small firms
to grow. - By creating and maintaining a host of absolutely
unnecessary brandnames, the competition's brandnames are crowded
out. Again, this cannot be legislated against. A firm has the right
to create and maintain as many brandnames as it wishes. The market
will exact a price and thus punish such a company because,
ultimately, its own brandname will suffer from the proliferation.
Get a "corner" (control, manipulate and regulate) on raw materials,
government licenses, contracts, subsidies, and patents (and, of
course, prevent the competition from having access to them).
Build up "political capital" with government bodies; overseas,
get "protection" from "the host government".
'Vertical' Barriers
Practice a "preemptive strategy" by capturing all capacity expansion
in the industry (simply buying it, leasing it or taking over the
companies that own or develop it).
This serves to "deny competitors enough residual demand". Residual
demand, as we previously explained, causes firms to be efficient.
Once efficient, they develop enough power to "credibly retaliate"
and thereby "enforce an orderly expansion process" to prevent
overcapacity
Create "switching" costs. - Through legislation, bureaucracy,
control of the media, cornering advertising space in the media,
controlling infrastructure, owning intellectual property, owning,
controlling or intimidating distribution channels and suppliers and
so on.
Impose vertical "price squeezes". - By owning, controlling,
colluding with, or intimidating suppliers and distributors,
marketing channels and wholesale and retail outlets into not
collaborating with the competition.
Practice vertical integration (buying suppliers and distribution and
marketing channels).
This has the following effects:
The firm gains a "tap (access) into technology" and marketing
information in an adjacent industry. It defends itself against a
supplier's too-high or even realistic prices.
It defends itself against foreclosure, bankruptcy and restructuring
or reorganization. Owning suppliers means that the supplies do not
cease even when payment is not affected, for instance.
It "protects proprietary information from suppliers" - otherwise the
firm might have to give outsiders access to its technology,
processes, formulas and other intellectual property.
It raises entry and mobility barriers against competitors. This is
why the State should legislate and act against any purchase, or
other types of control of suppliers and marketing channels which
service competitors and thus enhance competition.
It serves to "prove that a threat of full integration is credible"
and thus intimidate competitors.
Finally, it gets "detailed cost information" in an adjacent industry
(but doesn't integrate it into a "highly competitive industry").
"Capture distribution outlets" by vertical integration to "increase
barriers".
'Consolidate' the Industry
Send "signals" to threaten, bluff, preempt, or collude with
competitors.
Use a "fighting brand" (a low-price brand used only for price-
cutting).
Use "cross parry" (retaliate in another part of a competitor's
market).
Harass competitors with antitrust suits and other litigious
techniques.
Use "brute force" ("massed resources" applied "with finesse") to
attack competitors
or use "focal points" of pressure to collude with competitors on
price.
"Load up customers" at cut-rate prices to "deny new entrants a base"
and force them to "withdraw" from market.
Practice "buyer selection," focusing on those that are the
most "vulnerable" (easiest to overcharge) and discriminating against
and for certain types of consumers.
"Consolidate" the industry so as to "overcome industry
fragmentation".
This arguments is highly successful with US federal courts in the
last decade. There is an intuitive feeling that few is better and
that a consolidated industry is bound to be more efficient, better
able to compete and to survive and, ultimately, better positioned to
lower prices, to conduct costly research and development and to
increase quality. In the words of Porter: "(The) pay-off to
consolidating a fragmented industry can be high because... small and
weak competitors offer little threat of retaliation."
Time one's own capacity additions; never sell old capacity "to
anyone who will use it in the same industry" and buy out "and retire
competitors' capacity".
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AUTHOR BIO (must be included with the article)
Sam Vaknin ( samvak.tripod.com ) is the author of Malignant
Self Love - Narcissism Revisited and After the Rain - How the West
Lost the East. He served as a columnist for Central Europe Review,
PopMatters, Bellaonline, and eBookWeb, a United Press International
(UPI) Senior Business Correspondent, and the editor of mental health
and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory and
Suite101.
Until recently, he served as the Economic Advisor to the Government
of Macedonia.
Visit Sam's Web site at samvak.tripod.com
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