The Space Industry in Russia
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The Space Industry in Russia
By Sam Vaknin
Author of "Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited"
The recent (December 2005) spate of news about Russia's space
program was decidedly mixed. According to Space News, the 17-country
European Space Agency (ESA) declined to participate in Russia's $60
million, two-year Clipper manned and winged space vehicle program, a
touted alternative to NASA's Crew Exploration Vehicle.
With an anual budget of $800 million, the Russian Federal Space
Agency sought to minimize the importance of this surprising
turnabout. In a press conference, Nikolay Sevastiyanov, President of
the Russian aerospace contractor RSC-Energia, said: "We're starting
to design this new transportation system to support the
International Space Station (ISS) once it's complete." A space tug,
dubbed Parom, will tow the Clipper to the ISS.
But this is not the whole truth. The Clipper - a combined crew and
cargo vehicle - is at the heart of Russia's renewed attempt to land
crafts on the moon and on Mars.
The Clipper is the culmination of a decade of research, development,
and geopolitical maneuvering, involving many other elements.
Consider the "Volga". It is the name of a new liquid-fueled
retrievable and reusable (up to 50 times) booster-rocket engine. It
will be built by two Russian missile manufacturers for a consortium
of French, German, and Swedish aerospace firms. ESA - the European
Space Agency - intends to invest 1 billion euros over 10-15 years in
this new toy. This is a negligible sum in an $80 billion a year
market.
Russian rockets, such as the Soyuz U and Tsiklon, have been
launching satellites to orbit for decades now and not only for the
Russian defense ministry, their erstwhile exclusive client.
Communications satellites, such as Gonets D1 ("Courier"
or "Messenger"), and other commercial loads are gradually overtaking
their military observation, navigation, and communications brethren.
The Strategic Rocket Forces alone have earned more than $100 million
from commercial launches between 1997-9, reports "Kommersant", the
Russian business daily.
Still, many civilian satellites are not much more than stripped
military bodices. Commercial operators and Rosaviakosmos (Russia's
NASA) report to the newly re-established (June 2001) Russian
Military Space Forces. Technology gained in collaborative efforts
with the West is immediately transferred to the military.
Russia is worried by America's lead in space. The USA has 600
satellites to Russia's 100 (mostly obsolete) birds, according to
space.com. The revival of US plans for an anti-missile shield and
the imminent, unilateral, and inevitable American withdrawal from
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty add urgency to Russian scrambling
to catch up.
Despite well-publicized setbacks - such as the ominous crash at
Baikonur in Kazakhstan in July 1999 - Russian launchers are among
the most reliable there are. Fifty-seven of 59 launch attempts were
successful last year. By comparison, in 1963, only 55 out of 70
launch attempts met the same happy fate.
American aerospace multinationals closely collaborate with
Rosaviakosmos. Boeing maintains a design office in Russia to monitor
joint projects such as the commercial launch pad Sea Launch and the
ISS. It employs hundreds of Russian professionals in and out of
Russia.
There is also an emerging collaboration with the European Aeronautic
Defense and Space (EADS) company as well as with Arianespace, the
French group. A common launch pad is taking shape in Kourou and the
Soyuz is now co-owned by Russians and Europeans through Starsem, a
joint venture. Russia also intends to participate in the hitherto
dormant European RLV (Reusable Launch Vehicle) project.
The EU's decision, in the 2002 Barcelona summit, to give "Galileo"
the go ahead, would require close cooperation with Russia. "Galileo"
is a $3 billion European equivalent of the American GPS network of
satellites. It will most likely incorporate Russian technology, use
Russian launch facilities, and employ Russian engineers.
This collaboration may well revive Russia's impoverished and,
therefore, moribund space program with an infusion of more than $2
billion over the next decade.
But America and Europe are not the only ones queuing at Russia's
doorstep.
Stratfor, the Strategic Forecasting firm, reported about a deal
concluded in May 2001 between the Australian Ministry of Industry,
Science and Resources and the Russian Aviation and Space Agency.
Australian companies were granted exclusive rights to use the
Russian Aurora rocket outside Russia. In return, Russia will gain
access to the ideally located launch site at Christmas Island in the
Indian Ocean. This is a direct blow to competitors such as India,
South Korea, Japan, China, and Brazil.
Russian launch technology is very advanced and inexpensive, being
based, as it is, on existing military R&D. It has been licensed to
other space-aspiring countries. India's troubled Geosynchronous
Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) is based on Russian technology,
reports Stratfor. Many private satellite launching firms -
Australian and others - find Russian offerings commercially
irresistible. Russia - unlike the US - places no restrictions on the
types of load launched to space with its rockets.
Still, launch technologies are simple matters. Until 1995, Russia
launched more loads annually than the rest of the world combined -
despite its depleted budget (less than Brazil's). But Russia's space
shuttle program, the Energia-Buran, was its last big investment in
R&D. It was put to rest in 1988. Perhaps as a result, Russia failed
dismally to deliver on its end of the $660 million ISS bargain with
NASA. This has cost NASA well over $3 billion in re-planning.
The living quarters of the International Space Station (ISS),
codenamed "Zvezda", launched two years late, failed to meet the
onerous quality criteria of the Americans. It is noisy and
inadequately protected against meteorites, reported "The Economist".
Russia continues to supply the astronauts and has just launched from
Baikonur a Progress M1-8 cargo ship with 2.4 tons of food, fuel,
water, and oxygen.
The dark side of Russia's space industry is its sales of missile
technology to failed and rogue states throughout the world.
Timothy McCarthy and Victor Mizin of the U.S. Center for
Nonproliferation Studies wrote in the "International Herald Tribune
in November 2001:
"[U.S. policy to date] leaves unsolved the key structural problem
that contributes to illegal sales: over-capacity in the Russian
missile and space industry and the inability or unwillingness of
Moscow to do anything about it ... There is simply too much industry
[in Russia] chasing too few legitimate dollars, rubles or euros.
[Downsizing] and restructuring must be a major part of any
initiative that seeks to stop Russian missile firms from
selling 'excess production' to those who should not have them."
The official space industry has little choice but to resort to
missile proliferation for its survival. The Russian domestic market
is inefficient, technologically backward, and lacks venture capital.
It is thus unable to foster innovation and reward innovators in the
space industry. Its biggest clients - government and budget-funded
agencies - rarely pay or pay late. Prices for space-related services
do not reflect market realities.
According to fas.org's comprehensive survey of the Russian space
industry, investment in replacement of capital assets deteriorated
from 9 percent in 1998 to 0.5 percent in 1994. In the same period,
costs of materials shot up 382 times, cost of hardware services went
up by 172 times, while labour costs increased 82-fold. The average
salary in the space industry, once a multiple of the Russian average
wage, has now fallen beneath it. The resulting brain drain was
crippling. More than 35 percent of all workers left - and more than
half of all the experts.
Private firms are doing somewhat better, though. A Russian company
unveiled, in March 2002, a reusable vehicle for space tourism. The
ticket price - $100,000 for a 3-minutes trip. One hundred tickets
were already sold. The mock-up was exposed to the public in a
Russian air base.
As opposed to grandiosity-stricken Russia, Kazakhstan has few
pretensions to being anything but a convenient launching pad. It
reluctantly rents out Baikonur, its main site, to Russia for an $115
million a year. Russia pays late, reports accidents even later, and
pollutes the area frequently. Baikonur is only one of a few civilian
launch sites (Kapustin Yar, Plesetsk). It is supposed to be
abandoned by Russia in favor of Svobodny, a new (1997) site.
Kazakhstan expressed interest in a Russian-Kazakh-Ukrainian carrier
rocket, the Sodruzhestvo. It is even budgeted for in the Russian-
Kazakh space program budget 2000-2005. But both the Russians and the
Ukrainians were unable to cough up the necessary funds and the
project was put on indefinite hold.
Umirzak Sultangazin, the head of the Kazakh Institute for Space
Research, complained bitterly in an interview he granted last year
to the Russian-language "Karavan":
"Our own satellite is an dire need. So far, we are using
data "received" from US and Russian satellites. Some information we
use is free, but we have to pay for certain others ... We have high-
class specialists but they are leaving the institute for commercial
structures because they are offered several times bigger salaries. I
have many times raised this question and said: Look, Russia pays us
not a small amount to lease Baykonur [some 115m dollars a year], why
should we not spend part of this money on space research? We could
have developed the space sector and become a real space power."
Kazakhstan has its own earth profiling program administered by its
own cosmonauts. It runs biological and physical experiments in
orbit. The "tokhtar" is a potato developed in space and named after
Kazakhstan's first astronaut, the eponymous Tokhtar Aubakirov.
Almost all the former satellites of the USSR have established their
own space programs after they broke away, vowing never again to be
dependent on foreign good will. Romania founded ROSA, the Romanian
Space Agency in 1991. Hungary created the Hungarian Space Office.
The Baltic states - to the vocal dismay of many of their citizens -
work closely with NATO on military applications of satellites within
the framework of BALTNET (the Baltic air space control project).
Poland (1994), Hungary (1991), Romania (1992) and the Czech Republic
have been cooperating with ESA on a variety of space-related
commercial and civil projects.
Ukraine hedges its bets. It signed with Brazil a space industry
bilateral accord in January. A month later it signed five bilateral
agreements regarding the space industry with Russia.
Many Western academic institutions, NGO's, and commercial interests
created frameworks for collaboration with space scientists from
Central Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, CIS, and NIS. The
University of Maryland pioneered this trend with its East-West Space
Science Center, formed in 1990.
The space industry - and particularly the emerging field of launch
technologies - represents one of the few areas in which the former
communist countries may retain a competitive edge and a relative
advantage. The West would do well to encourage the commercialization
of this knowledge. The alternative is proliferation of missile
technologies and military applications of technology transferred
within collaborative efforts on civilian projects with Western
partners. The West can save itself a lot of money and heartache by
being generous early on.
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AUTHOR BIO (must be included with the article)
Sam Vaknin ( samvak.tripod.com ) is the author of Malignant
Self Love - Narcissism Revisited and After the Rain - How the West
Lost the East. He served as a columnist for Global Politician,
Central Europe Review, PopMatters, Bellaonline, and eBookWeb, a
United Press International (UPI) Senior Business Correspondent, and
the editor of mental health and Central East Europe categories in
The Open Directory and Suite101.
Until recently, he served as the Economic Advisor to the Government
of Macedonia.
Visit Sam's Web site at samvak.tripod.com
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