How to Compete with Oligopolies
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How to Compete with Oligopolies
By Sam Vaknin
Author of "Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited"
The Wall Street Journal has recently published an elegiac list:
"Twenty years ago, cable television was dominated by a patchwork of
thousands of tiny, family-operated companies. Today, a pending deal
would leave three companies in control of nearly two-thirds of the
market. In 1990, three big publishers of college textbooks accounted
for 35% of industry sales. Today they have 62% ... Five titans
dominate the (defense) industry, and one of them, Northrop
Grumman ... made a surprise (successful) $5.9 billion bid for
(another) TRW ... In 1996, when Congress deregulated
telecommunications, there were eight Baby Bells. Today there are
four, and dozens of small rivals are dead. In 1999, more than 10
significant firms offered help-wanted Web sites. Today, three firms
dominate."
Mergers, business failures, deregulation, globalization, technology,
dwindling and more cautious venture capital, avaricious managers and
investors out to increase share prices through a spree of often ill-
thought acquisitions - all lead inexorably to the congealing of
industries into a few suppliers. Such market formations are known as
oligopolies. Oligopolies encourage customers to collaborate in
oligopsonies and these, in turn, foster further consolidation among
suppliers, service providers, and manufacturers.
Market purists consider oligopolies - not to mention cartels - to be
as villainous as monopolies. Oligopolies, they intone, restrict
competition unfairly, retard innovation, charge rent and price their
products higher than they could have in a perfect competition free
market with multiple participants. Worse still, oligopolies are
going global.
But how does one determine market concentration to start with?
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann index squares the market shares of firms
in the industry and adds up the total. But the number of firms in a
market does not necessarily impart how low - or high - are barriers
to entry. These are determined by the structure of the market, legal
and bureaucratic hurdles, the existence, or lack thereof of
functioning institutions, and by the possibility to turn an excess
profit.
The index suffers from other shortcomings. Often the market is
difficult to define. Mergers do not always drive prices higher.
University of Chicago economists studying Industrial Organization -
the branch of economics that deals with competition - have long
advocated a shift of emphasis from market share to - usually
temporary - market power. Influential antitrust thinkers, such as
Robert Bork, recommended to revise the law to focus solely on
consumer welfare.
These - and other insights - were incorporated in a theory of market
contestability. Contrary to classical economic thinking, monopolies
and oligopolies rarely raise prices for fear of attracting new
competitors, went the new school. This is especially true in
a "contestable" market - where entry is easy and cheap.
An Oligopolistic firm also fears the price-cutting reaction of its
rivals if it reduces prices, goes the Hall, Hitch, and Sweezy theory
of the Kinked Demand Curve. If it were to raise prices, its rivals
may not follow suit, thus undermining its market share.
Stackleberg's amendments to Cournot's Competition model, on the
other hand, demonstrate the advantages to a price setter of being a
first mover.
In "Economic assessment of oligopolies under the Community Merger
Control Regulation, in European Competition law Review (Vol 4, Issue
3), Juan Briones Alonso writes:
"At first sight, it seems that ... oligopolists will sooner or later
find a way of avoiding competition among themselves, since they are
aware that their overall profits are maximized with this strategy.
However, the question is much more complex. First of all, collusion
without explicit agreements is not easy to achieve. Each supplier
might have different views on the level of prices which the demand
would sustain, or might have different price preferences according
to its cost conditions and market share. A company might think it
has certain advantages which its competitors do not have, and would
perhaps perceive a conflict between maximising its own profits and
maximizing industry profits.
Moreover, if collusive strategies are implemented, and oligopolists
manage to raise prices significantly above their competitive level,
each oligopolist will be confronted with a conflict between sticking
to the tacitly agreed behaviour and increasing its individual
profits by 'cheating' on its competitors. Therefore, the question of
mutual monitoring and control is a key issue in collusive
oligopolies."
Monopolies and oligopolies, went the contestability theory, also
refrain from restricting output, lest their market share be snatched
by new entrants. In other words, even monopolists behave as though
their market was fully competitive, their production and pricing
decisions and actions constrained by the "ghosts" of potential and
threatening newcomers.
In a CRIEFF Discussion Paper titled "From Walrasian Oligopolies to
Natural Monopoly - An Evolutionary Model of Market Structure", the
authors argue that: "Under decreasing returns and some fixed cost,
the market grows to 'full capacity' at Walrasian equilibrium
(oligopolies); on the other hand, if returns are increasing, the
unique long run outcome involves a profit-maximising monopolist."
While intellectually tempting, contestability theory has little to
do with the rough and tumble world of business. Contestable markets
simply do not exist. Entering a market is never cheap, nor easy.
Huge sunk costs are required to counter the network effects of more
veteran products as well as the competitors' brand recognition and
ability and inclination to collude to set prices.
Victory is not guaranteed, losses loom constantly, investors are
forever edgy, customers are fickle, bankers itchy, capital markets
gloomy, suppliers beholden to the competition. Barriers to entry are
almost always formidable and often insurmountable.
In the real world, tacit and implicit understandings regarding
prices and competitive behavior prevail among competitors within
oligopolies. Establishing a reputation for collusive predatory
pricing deters potential entrants. And a dominant position in one
market can be leveraged into another, connected or derivative,
market.
But not everyone agrees. Ellis Hawley believed that industries
should be encouraged to grow because only size guarantees survival,
lower prices, and innovation. Louis Galambos, a business historian
at Johns Hopkins University, published a 1994 paper titled "The
Triumph of Oligopoly". In it, he strove to explain why firms and
managers - and even consumers - prefer oligopolies to both
monopolies and completely free markets with numerous entrants.
Oligopolies, as opposed to monopolies, attract less attention from
trustbusters. Quoted in the Wall Street Journal on March 8, 1999,
Galambos wrote: "Oligopolistic competition proved to be
beneficial ... because it prevented ossification, ensuring that
managements would keep their organizations innovative and efficient
over the long run."
In his recently published tome "The Free-Market Innovation Machine -
Analysing the Growth Miracle of Capitalism", William Baumol of
Princeton University, concurs. He daringly argues that productive
innovation is at its most prolific and qualitative in oligopolistic
markets. Because firms in an oligopoly characteristically charge
above-equilibrium (i.e., high) prices - the only way to compete is
through product differentiation. This is achieved by constant
innovation - and by incessant advertising.
Baumol maintains that oligopolies are the real engines of growth and
higher living standards and urges antitrust authorities to leave
them be. Lower regulatory costs, economies of scale and of scope,
excess profits due to the ability to set prices in a less
competitive market - allow firms in an oligopoly to invest heavily
in research and development. A new drug costs c. $800 million to
develop and get approved, according to Joseph DiMasi of Tufts
University's Center for the Study of Drug Development, quoted in The
wall Street Journal.
In a paper titled "If Cartels Were Legal, Would Firms Fix Prices",
implausibly published by the Antitrust Division of the US Department
of Justice in 1997, Andrew Dick demonstrated, counterintuitively,
that cartels are more likely to form in industries and sectors with
many producers. The more concentrated the industry - i.e., the more
oligopolistic it is - the less likely were cartels to emerge.
Cartels are conceived in order to cut members' costs of sales. Small
firms are motivated to pool their purchasing and thus secure
discounts. Dick draws attention to a paradox: mergers provoke the
competitors of the merging firms to complain. Why do they act this
way?
Mergers and acquisitions enhance market concentration. According to
conventional wisdom, the more concentrated the industry, the higher
the prices every producer or supplier can charge. Why would anyone
complain about being able to raise prices in a post-merger market?
Apparently, conventional wisdom is wrong. Market concentration leads
to price wars, to the great benefit of the consumer. This is why
firms find the mergers and acquisitions of their competitors
worrisome. America's soft drink market is ruled by two firms - Pepsi
and Coca-Cola. Yet, it has been the scene of ferocious price
competition for decades.
"The Economist", in its review of the paper, summed it up neatly:
"The story of America's export cartels suggests that when firms
decide to co-operate, rather than compete, they do not always have
price increases in mind. Sometimes, they get together simply in
order to cut costs, which can be of benefit to consumers."
The very atom of antitrust thinking - the firm - has changed in the
last two decades. No longer hierarchical and rigid, business
resembles self-assembling, nimble, ad-hoc networks of
entrepreneurship superimposed on ever-shifting product groups and
profit and loss centers.
Competition used to be extraneous to the firm - now it is commonly
an internal affair among autonomous units within a loose overall
structure. This is how Jack "neutron" Welsh deliberately structured
General Electric. AOL-Time Warner hosts many competing units, yet no
one ever instructs them either to curb this internecine competition,
to stop cannibalizing each other, or to start collaborating
synergistically. The few mammoth agencies that rule the world of
advertising now host a clutch of creative boutiques comfortably
ensconced behind Chinese walls. Such outfits often manage the
accounts of competitors under the same corporate umbrella.
Most firms act as intermediaries. They consume inputs, process them,
and sell them as inputs to other firms. Thus, many firms are
concomitantly consumers, producers, and suppliers. In a paper
published last year and titled "Productive Differentiation in
Successive Vertical Oligopolies", that authors studied:
"An oligopoly model with two brands. Each downstream firm chooses
one brand to sell on a final market. The upstream firms specialize
in the production of one input specifically designed for the
production of one brand, but they also produce he input for the
other brand at an extra cost. (They concluded that) when more
downstream brands choose one brand, more upstream firms will
specialize in the input specific to that brand, and vice versa.
Hence, multiple equilibria are possible and the softening effect of
brand differentiation on competition might not be strong enough to
induce maximal differentiation" (and, thus, minimal competition).
Both scholars and laymen often mix their terms. Competition does not
necessarily translate either to variety or to lower prices. Many
consumers are turned off by too much choice. Lower prices sometimes
deter competition and new entrants. A multiplicity of vendors,
retail outlets, producers, or suppliers does not always foster
competition. And many products have umpteen substitutes. Consider
films - cable TV, satellite, the Internet, cinemas, video rental
shops, all offer the same service: visual content delivery.
And then there is the issue of technological standards. It is
incalculably easier to adopt a single worldwide or industry-wide
standard in an oligopolistic environment. Standards are known to
decrease prices by cutting down R&D expenditures and systematizing
components.
Or, take innovation. It is used not only to differentiate one's
products from the competitors' - but to introduce new generations
and classes of products. Only firms with a dominant market share
have both the incentive and the wherewithal to invest in R&D and in
subsequent branding and marketing.
But oligopolies in deregulated markets have sometimes substituted
price fixing, extended intellectual property rights, and competitive
restraint for market regulation. Still, Schumpeter believed in the
faculty of "disruptive technologies" and "destructive creation" to
check the power of oligopolies to set extortionate prices, lower
customer care standards, or inhibit competition.
Linux threatens Windows. Opera nibbles at Microsoft's Internet
Explorer. Amazon drubbed traditional booksellers. eBay thrashes
Amazon. Bell was forced by Covad Communications to implement its own
technology, the DSL broadband phone line.
Barring criminal behavior, there is little that oligopolies can do
to defend themselves against these forces. They can acquire
innovative firms, intellectual property, and talent. They can form
strategic partnerships. But the supply of innovators and new
technologies is infinite - and the resources of oligopolies, however
mighty, are finite. The market is stronger than any of its
participants, regardless of the hubris of some, or the paranoia of
others.
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AUTHOR BIO (must be included with the article)
Sam Vaknin ( samvak.tripod.com ) is the author of Malignant
Self Love - Narcissism Revisited and After the Rain - How the West
Lost the East. He served as a columnist for Global Politician,
Central Europe Review, PopMatters, Bellaonline, and eBookWeb, a
United Press International (UPI) Senior Business Correspondent, and
the editor of mental health and Central East Europe categories in
The Open Directory and Suite101.
Until recently, he served as the Economic Advisor to the Government
of Macedonia.
Visit Sam's Web site at samvak.tripod.com
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