Processing the Export Zones
Ukrainian President, Leonid Kuchma, told, in February 2003, an assembly of
senior customs service officials that "it is necessary to put an end to
(Ukraine's 11 free economic and 9 priority) zones (and) liquidate them
completely. (They) have become semi-criminal zones, and this refers not only
to the Donetsk zone. You pull the meat that Europe doesn't want to eat into
these zones and sell it there without [paying] taxes".
According to UNIAN, the Ukrainian news agency, Kuchma was fuming at the
mighty and unaccountable oligarchs situated in the country's eastern
coal-mining center and their collaborators in the Ukrainian Security Service
(SBU) and other law enforcement agencies. The zones dismally failed to
attract foreign direct investment, or foster economic growth, he bitterly
observed.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) concurs as does the European Union.
The future status of special economic zones is hotly contested in the
accession negotiations with the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Malta.
Nor is the criminalization of such zones a Ukrainian deviation. Russia's
Deputy Interior Minister, Vladimir Vasiliev, admitted last year that
Russia's mafia now focuses its unwelcome attentions on its ubiquitous free
economic zones.
Yet, the proliferation of these fiscal monstrosities - tax free, low
customs, export processing, flexible labor delimited regions - is likely to
continue. Even bastions of free trade make profligate use of them as do all
the countries of the rich world.
According to a November 2002 report titled "Employment and social policy in
respect of export processing zones" and published by the United Nations'
International Labor Organization (ILO), the number of countries with export
processing zones surged from 25 in 1975 to 116 last year. The number of such
havens jumped to 3000 from a mere 79.
A January 2002 amendment to Estonia's value added tax law allows its
fishermen to export to Russia more than $100 million worth of catch via tax
free enclaves. Virtually all the countries of central, east and southeast
Europe (the Balkans) either toyed with the idea, or established such zones,
the first being Russia, Poland and Bulgaria.
Even hidebound and xenophobic Belarus founded in 2000 four Free Economic
Zones (FEZs), located in Brest, Minsk, Gomel-Raton and Vitebsk, to, in its
words, "attract foreign investment, promote high-tech manufacturing and
increase economic diversification". The zones, claim the authorities, have
been a success. The Brest one drew in excess of $120 million in investments
and has created 5000 new jobs.
Multilateral lenders and international trade partners are unhappy.
Exemptions from taxes and customs duties amount to overt export subventions.
The goods thus subsidized often end up in the local market, unfairly
competing with both indigenous producers and importers.
Responding to such pressures, Kyrgyzstan now requires enterprises located
within the free-economic zone to pay customs and other taxes on goods they
sell domestically. Both the European Union and the United States expressed
extreme displeasure at the formation of Macedonia's Taiwan-financed free
zone in Bunardzik in 1999.
It has since flopped and has been leased last September for 30 years to Ital
Mak Furnir, an improbable German-Italian-Macedonian partnership. The only
occupant of the sole building constructed in the zone by the Taiwanese is
rented to the NATO mission in Macedonia - hardly a business enterprise.
The free economic zone of the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, formed in 1992
and revamped in both 1996 and in 1997, under the new law on Free Economic
Zones, shares a similar fate. Lithuania's industrial parks are not
successful either. The free zone of Kukuljanovo in the industrial zone of
Bakar, about 17 km from the Port of Rijeka Free Zone in Croatia, actually
serves as a trans-shipment and off-shore area, rather than a classic export
processing district. It is one of 13 such fiscal havens.
Tax free, customs and export processing territories - though they may
enhance employment, as they did in China, for one - distort the economic
decisions of investors, manufacturers, importers and exporters. Budget
revenues are adversely affected. The zones attract shady "industrialists"
and "financiers" who set up fronts for illicit activities, such as
smuggling, unauthorized assembly of consumer goods, or piracy of
intellectual piracy.
These extraterritorial hubs are major centers of money laundering, parallel
imports of shoddy or counterfeit goods and forbidden re-importation of
merchandise originally sold to poor, developing countries at substantial
discounts, or provided as international aid.
The Ukrainian Vice-Premier Kozachenko estimated, last May, that one fifth of
all meat sold in Ukraine was smuggled through the special zones, reported
UkInform. Most of it is unfit for human consumption. The impoverished
country lost $56 million in customs duties on these products in 2001 alone.
In the meantime, the local meat industry is "choking" in the words of Yuri
Melnik, Deputy State Secretary for the Ministry of Agrarian Policy.
Yet, the undermining of local production is not the only impact on
oft-struggling host economies. According to the ILO, throughput from special
zones accounts for 80 percent of all the merchandise exports of the Czech
Republic and Hungary. But very little of this abundance trickles down:
"Legal restrictions on trade union rights in a few EPZ operating countries,
the lack of enforcement of labour legislation and the absence of workers'
organizations representation were among the factors noted as undermining the
ability of zones to upgrade skills, improve working conditions and
productivity and thereby to become more dynamic and internationally
competitive platforms."
And the contribution of these zones to economic growth and subsequent
prosperity? Dubious, at best. The ILO concludes:
"(There is a) lack of reliable ... statistics regarding the costs and
benefits of zones. While some data exist relating to the amount of
investment, exports and employment in zones, there is very little ... on the
quality, cost and duration of those jobs, on the degree of skill and
technology transfer and on the opportunity cost of the fiscal incentives and
infrastructure costs. (We don't know) why export processing zones (EPZs)
have failed to take off in some countries. While political stability and
investment in the basic infrastructure in ports, airports, roads, water,
sanitation and power supply are necessary conditions for EPZs, they are not
sufficient on their own to attract FDI. Macroeconomic conditions such as
extreme inflation and high interest rates (are important) ... Research
suggests that zones are most effective when they form part of an integrated
economic strategy that includes fiscal incentives, investments in
infrastructure, technology and human capital, and the creation of linkages
into the local economy. It is important for EPZs to upgrade their activities
to higher value-added products and services (requiring a more skilled
workforce) and find their niche in the international production network ...
(EPZs strategies must, therefore, be) continually adapt(ed)."
The countries of east Europe and The Balkans lack the skills and experience
to do so - and the money needed to hire international consultants to monitor
and modify the zones' performance and characteristics. Hence the hitherto
abysmal performance of these contraptions - and the emerging trend to
disassemble them.
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Sam Vaknin ( samvak.tripod.com ) is the author of Malignant Self
Love - Narcissism Revisited and After the Rain - How the West Lost the East.
He served as a columnist for Global Politician, Central Europe Review,
PopMatters, Bellaonline, and eBookWeb, a United Press International (UPI)
Senior Business Correspondent, and the editor of mental health and Central
East Europe categories in The Open Directory and Suite101.
Visit Sam's Web site at samvak.tripod.com
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