BOOK
Runway departure during attempted takeoff, Tower Air flight 41, Boeing 747-136, N605FF, JFK International Airport, New York, December 10, 1995 (SuDoc TD 1.112:96/04)
U.S. Dept of Transportation
About this product:
On December 20, 1995, Tower Air flight 41 attempted takeoff from runway 4L at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York. At the time the runway was contaminated by snow and ice, and a substantial crosswind existed. The aircraft achieved takeoff power, but quickly started to depart from the runway, at which point the Captain aborted the takeoff. The aircraft departed the runway and was damaged beyond repair. Of the 468 people aboard, 24 passengers received minor injuries, and a Flight Attendant received serious injuries.
This report closely analyzes control inputs made by the Captain as well as Tower Air and Boeing procedures, and found all deficient. The Captain used the nosewheel steering tiller (normally only used for maneuvering during taxi) rather than a more industry standard method of using only the rudder pedals for directional control during the takeoff. In his defense, this was an accepted practice at Tower Air at the time as it was a carryover from some early B-747's they operated that did not have a rudder pedal-nosewheel steering interconnect. The problem with this is that the tiller is capable of very large steering angles, making it very prone to overcontrolling the nosewheel prior to rudder aerodynamic effectiveness in the B-747. When attempting to correct back to centerline with the tiller, the Captain unwittingly allowed the nosewheel to skid (another hazard of the technique he used) and thereby lost directional control of the aircraft. The report details the nuances of this phenomena, and the faults in both Tower Air and Boeing procedures.
The report is more interesting in other respects, and serves as an excellent example of a crew coordination problem for the Flight Attendants. In this case, damage to the aircraft made portions of the public address and interphone systems of the aircraft become inoperative: the resulting confusion between the separate portions of the aircraft had a large potential for further, more serious cabin problems (e.g. partial unintended evacuation from an aircraft with a collapsed nose landing gear into arctic conditions, etc.) This accident, therefore, serves as an excellent accident to analyze in future Crew Resource Management (CRM) training, and has been widely used in that capacity by a variety of airlines.
The accident also points out problems in training and operating a mixed fleet of aircraft. The aircraft involved in the accident was one of three different subtypes of B-747 Tower Air operated at the time: all had similar galleys, but the carts varied significantly. Flight Attendants were only trained on one type of cart, however, and in this accident a very large and heavy cart of a unique design broke free and seriously injured a Flight Attendant.
This accident is well worth reviewing for pilots (especially pilots of heavy aircraft with wing mounted engines who frequent contaminated runways, and particularly B-747 pilots), Flight Attendants, safety, and training professionals. The NTSB provides a very detailed, interesting, and cogent description and analysis of the accident in this report (AAR 96-04), and I recommend it to relevant parties.